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Abstract
International experience proves that electricity prices have undergone major changes
in volatility since the entry of green technologies. The intermittency of renewable
sources is one of the reasons for these changes, as it leads to higher volatility in
periods of higher participation by renewables. We argue that the development of
the regulatory system promoting renewable electricity also plays a crucial role. We
raise a question that deserves attention: could an incentive scheme induce higher
share of renewables and lower volatility simultaneously? In this paper, we conduct
an empirical analysis with Spanish data. We analyze possible ensuing structural
changes in Spanish electricity spot price volatility from January 2002 to Decem-
ber 2017. We identify two structural breaks linked to important measures related
to renewable electricity: (i) the abolishment of the feed-in tariff scheme; and (ii)
the establishment of a more market-oriented regulation based on investment and
operating costs. We conclude that stable regulatory policies reduce volatility even
though the presence of renewable sources is greater. Furthermore, market-based
policy measures achieve lower volatility, encouraging good integration of intermit-
tent renewable electricity.
Keywords: electricity prices, GARCH models, regulation, renewable energy,
structural breaks
1. Introduction
In the transition to low-carbon economies, incentive-based regulatory policies
have been widely used worldwide to promote electricity generation from Renew-
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able Energy Sources (RES-E).1 These measures have proven to be successful in
expanding renewable capacity, but they have not been exempted from costs. Spain
is indeed an interesting case study to evaluate the effect of these regulations, given
the high RES-E share rate and the important changes to the regulatory system
over the years. Specifically, RES-E presence in Spain has grown steadily since
the incentive scheme based on feed-in tariffs (FIT) and feed-in premiums (FIP)2
promoting green sources was approved after the liberalization of the electricity
market in 1997. However, this system imposed an important cost-burden on con-
sumers (Espinosa and Pizarro-Irizar, 2018) and therefore underwent continuous
cost-containment measures from 2010 onwards until it was completely phased out
in 2013. Finally, in 2014 it was replaced by a more market-based incentive system
based on remuneration for investment and operation of the RES-E plants.
The RES-E share over total production level has also fluctuated, as Figure 1
shows (solid line) throughout this period of continuous regulatory change. The
upward RES-E trend to 2010 was linked to the FIT-FIP system, but renewable
production share stabilized after the constraints began (though RES-E volatil-
ity increased). Figure 1 also shows that RES-E share plays an important role in
electricity prices. On the one hand, the comparison of the electricity price series
(dashed line) and the evolution of RES-E share on the Spanish electricity market
confirms that periods with higher RES-E share result in lower electricity price lev-
els. This is due to the fact that RES-E generally displaces conventional technolo-
gies, which usually have higher variable costs due to the use of fossil fuels (Sáenz
de Miera et al., 2008). On the other hand, price volatility increases when more
intermittent RES-E, such as wind or solar, is produced (Ketterer, 2014, Kyritsis et
al., 2017, Rintamaki et al., 2017, Sapio, 2019). Since RES-E production is strongly
linked to the regulatory measures concerning its promotion (i.e. incentives driving
investment), a RES-E boost via public policies would reduce market prices, but
it would also increase price volatility. For Spain, Ballester and Furió (2015) an-
alyze the relationship between RES-E participation and volatility in the Spanish
day-ahead electricity market and find a negative relationship between the share
of generation attributable to renewables and day-ahead marginal market prices,
1RES-E includes Wind, Solar Photovoltaic, Solar Thermal, Small Hydro power and
Biomass/Wastes. Large Hydro power is not included since remuneration is not different from the
Non-RES-E units. Even though Combined Heat and Power (CHP) is not based on renewable
sources, we have included it in our study because it is subsidized, given its efficiency potential.
2Under a FIT scheme, renewable generators receive a minimum guaranteed price per kWh sold
on the electricity market, including different fees by technology. Under a FIP scheme, renewable
generators receive a premium paid on top of the market price for the electricity they sell on the
market (Ciarreta et al., 2017a). For a detailed explanation of the FIT-FIP system in Spain see
del Ŕıo (2008) and references therein.
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which is consistent with the findings of the literature at international level. How-
ever, when they consider peak and off-peak prices separately they prove that price
volatility is higher during peak hours when RES-E participation is lower, whereas
volatility decreases when RES-E shares increase. This suggests that changes in
volatility could differ depending on the relationship between demand and the level
of RES-E participation.
Figure 1: Electricity prices and RES-E share (weekly data)

































Source: Own work based on price data from the Spanish market operator: OMIE (2018a) for
prices and OMIE (2018b) for RES-E.
Electricity markets, compared to other commodities, are particularly volatile,
given the lack of substitutes for electricity, fuel price uncertainty, weather effects
and the high storage costs3 (Hadsell et al., 2004). Volatility provides a measure
of price uncertainty affecting investment negatively. Indeed, it is precisely the
degree of price variation, and not the price level itself, which defines a volatile
market. When volatility rises, firms may delay investments, since the investment
costs increase. Furthermore, investors could even choose less capital-intensive
generation technologies, even if this creates higher fuel costs and may further
increase the costs of producing electricity (Neuhoff and De Vries, 2004). A low
and volatile electricity price could thus delay investment, both in renewable and
conventional technologies, limiting the scope of the RES-E promotion scheme itself
3Electricity storage could foster the large-scale introduction of RES-E, since it would reduce
its intermittency. However, this technology is currently available only to a limited extent and at
a very high cost.
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and also affecting the transformation of the whole electricity system, as shown in
Ishii and Yan (2004). Additionally, regulatory uncertainty is another major source
of investment risk, particularly in a fast transforming regulatory framework (De
Vries and Hakvoort, 2004). The importance of stable regulatory policies is further
outlined by Roques et al. (2005) and Cambini and Rondi (2010).
In this sense, we raise a question that deserves attention: what is the role
of the RES-E policies implemented in Spain on electricity price volatility? More
specifically, do regulatory policies promoting RES-E using FIT and FIP increase
volatility more than cost-containing measures such as the new Spanish regulatory
system based on a “reasonable rate of return”?4 And furthermore, could any of
these incentive schemes induce lower volatility? A quantitative analysis of the
Spanish RES-E policy evolution could help to answer these questions, given that
two very different incentive schemes have been in force over time: the FIT-FIP
system and the system based on the remuneration for investment in and operating
the RES-E plants based on the reasonable return principle.
In this paper, therefore, we analyze possible structural changes ensuing from
regulation in the Spanish electricity spot price volatility during the period from
January 2002 to December 2017. We focus on RES-E regulation, since most of
the regulatory changes in Spain post-liberalization of the electricity sector concern
RES-E, given the priority of meeting European climate policy targets in terms of
renewable energy consumption and emissions reduction. In particular, we claim
that the continuous changes in the Spanish regulatory policy on RES-E could
have caused structural breaks in the electricity price volatility. Renewable energy
growth in the Spanish electricity market stopped during the period between the
abolishment of the FIT-FIP system between 2012 and 2013 and the establishment
of the remuneration scheme based on the rate of return of the investments in 2014.
Our hypothesis is that during this period of high regulatory uncertainty, electricity
prices experienced important changes in volatility. Moreover, we claim that the
volatility of electricity prices could have changed under the different regulatory
schemes (FIT-FIP vs. rate of return) and even undergone structural breaks.
This result would have interesting policy implications for countries facing or
about to face similar challenges with their incentive systems, since regulators now
have to adapt their energy policy towards more market-based support systems,
thanks to the technological RES-E developments that prevent the necessity of
strong incentive levels such as FIT, and higher RES-E shares. Therefore, selecting
the best policy tools for a given market could encourage smoother RES-E integra-
4The “reasonable return” concept applied in the above-mentioned remuneration regime in
Spain is a remuneration supplement for investment paid on top of the market price. It is calcu-
lated taking into account a theoretical initial investment value and a regulatory useful life during
which the facility is eligible to receive this supplement. See Appendix A for more detail.
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tion and thus reduce certain negative effects of price volatility on investment, such
as the price risk.
Other authors have also investigated the role of regulatory changes on price
volatility in different markets by detecting structural changes. For instance, Fa-
giani and Hakvoort (2014) analyze whether certificate price volatility in the Swedish
/ Norwegian market changed after a joint market was created. They conclude that
regulatory uncertainty induces a negative impact in terms of increased price volatil-
ity. Ewing and Malik (2017) account for the effects of oil price shocks, focusing
on the different effect that good and bad news have on oil price volatility dynam-
ics. Mosquera-López and Nursimulu (2019) identify several breaking points along
the spot price path on the German electricity market caused by different RES
generation periods. With respect to the relationship between RES-E regulation
and volatility, Auer (2016) analyzes whether the volatility of electricity prices in
Germany has changed significantly with the introduction of RES-E regulation. He
finds that German policy measures encourage intermittent renewable electricity to
be well integrated in the power system because the price volatility reduced when
the marketing mechanism for renewable electricity changed.
Our paper combines the regulatory analysis followed by Fagiani and Hakvoort
(2014) with the analysis of the asymmetric effect that different shocks (in our
case FIT and the new regulation based on the reasonable rate of return) has
on volatility, as suggested by Ewing and Malik (2017). We add to the existing
literature by exploring which RES-E policies could lead to a lower price volatility
and therefore reduce investment uncertainty on electricity markets. Additionally,
this analysis has never been previously performed with electricity data.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes and reviews
the evolution of the Spanish regulatory system concerning RES-E promotion. Sec-
tion 3 and Section 4 detail the data and the methodology employed, respectively.
Section 5 presents the main empirical results. Section 6 relates the results with the
regulatory changes that the Spanish electricity system went through from 2002 to
2017. Finally, Section 7 concludes with some policy implications.
2. The Spanish regulatory system
This section begins by summarizing the most relevant regulatory measures im-
plemented on the Spanish electricity market after its liberalization (Subsection
2.1). It is followed by a discussion of the potential implications of different regu-
latory schemes (Subsection 2.2).
2.1. Policy overview
The Electricity Sector Act (BOE, 1997) liberalized the Spanish electricity sector
and guaranteed electricity supply at the “lowest possible cost”. The legislation,
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which was in force until 2013, established guaranteed of access to the grid for
renewable energy producers and specified the first incentive scheme for renewable
energy and Combined Heat and Power (CHP). During the greatest renewable
expansion period in Spain (from 2004 until 2012), RES-E was therefore supported
by a combined system of FIT and FIP, which was established in the Renewable
Energy Act (BOE, 2004) and renewed in 2007 (BOE, 2007). During that period,
RES-E grew from 9% gross generation in 2004 to 28% in 2013 (REE, 2002-2017).
However, one of the most important political concerns at that time was the reg-
ulated activities deficits (or tariff deficit), which had increased from e0.25 billion
in the year 2000 to e26 billion in 2013, and was leading to a significant financial
black hole nationwide (CNE/CNMC, 2007-2013). The Spanish tariff deficit was
the result of the difference between the income from the electricity system and its
regulatory costs. The FIT-FIP incentive scheme to RES-E accounted for a large
part of it (e9.3 billion in 2013, 46% of total regulatory costs), which led to an
energy reform including the suppression of tariffs in 2013 and the enacted of a new
remuneration system for RES-E from 2014 onwards.
The new Electricity Sector Act (BOE, 2013a) derogated the incentive system
based on FIT and FIP for both new and existing generation units and established
a new more market-oriented remuneration scheme based on a reasonable rate of
return of the electricity plants. The new remuneration system for RES-E, in force
since mid-2014, supplements market revenues with a specific regulated subsidy,
sufficient to attain the minimum level required to recover their investment and
operating costs. In the case of technologies with higher operating costs (i.e. Solar
Photovoltaic, Solar Thermal and CHP) the regime also provides a supplement
aimed at covering the portion of operating costs that cannot be recovered via
market prices. See Appendix A for a detailed explanation of this regulatory scheme
based on a rate of return.
Table 1 provides a summary of the above mentioned milestones in the Spanish
RES-E regulation.
2.2. Policy analysis
Regulatory uncertainty is generally associated to excess price volatility com-
pared to periods of stability. Agents can implement more predictable strategies
in periods where the regulatory framework remains stable. Prices will therefore
fluctuate according to economy fundamentals.
The period between the end of 2012 and mid-2014 was one of intense regula-
tory instability in Spain, as outlined in Subsection 2.1. The government cut on
the FIT-FIP system progressively and, moreover, it announced a new regulatory
framework that took several months to set up. During 2013, RES-E generators
collected incentives from the former FIT-FIP regime and they had to return these
sums over the course of 2014 once the new system was established. Consequently,
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Table 1: Spanish renewable energy policy overview (1997-2016)
Act 54/1997, Electricity Sector Act. Liberalization of the electricity sector.
RD 2818/1998 Establishment of a Special Regime (SR) for RES-E and
CHP with an incentive system based on FIT
updated annually and reviewed every four years.
RD 436/2004 Renewable Energy Act. Establishment of a methodology based on tariffs
and premiums for the updating and systematization
of the legal and economic regime of
the activity of SR electricity production. This record supersedes
RD 2818/1998.
It supposed the true takeoff of RES-E in Spain.
RD 661/2007 Regulation of the production of electricity under the SR.
This record supersedes RD 436/2004. The cost of the regime is borne
by the grid operator, who can pass on costs to consumers. It includes
greater subsidies for biomass and CHP, as well as the introduction
of floors and ceilings for the premium system.
RD 1614/2010, Cuts to the tariff system for solar thermal and wind energy.
RD-l 14/2010 It defines a maximum quota of energy capable of receiving public
support for thermo-solar, photovoltaic and wind energy.
It also establishes a 0.5 e/MWh fee as a grid access charge,
implemented by RD 1544/2011.
RD-l 1/2012 Renewable moratorium. Temporary suppression of incentives
(tariffs and premiums) for new energy from renewable sources
and CHP after January, 2012.
Law 15/2012 Establishment of a 7% generation charge levied on all generators.
RD-l 2/2013 Abolishment of the premium system in February, 2013.
Tariffs to existing facilities hold.
RD-l 9/2013 Abolishment of the tariff system in July, 2013.
Act 24/2013 New Electricity Sector Act from January, 2014. This record
supersedes 94/1997 and it is currently in force.
RD 413/2014, New remuneration scheme for RES-E and CHP
IET/1045/2014 (not called SR anymore). For existing facilities, it is based on a fixed
rate of return on investment calculated from tabulated parameters.
The moratorium for new facilities is maintained.
This record supersedes RD 661/2007.
RD 947/2015, Regulation of the procedure to assign the remuneration regime
IET/2212/2015 to new RES-E facilities by auction.
Source: Own work based on official data from the Spanish regulation (BOE 1997, 1998, 2004,
2007, 2010b, 2010c, 2011, 2012a, 2012b, 2013a, 2013b, 2013c, 2014a, 2014b, 2015b, 2015c).
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RES-E generators were on the market without a clear reward scheme for several
months, which increased uncertainty in renewable energy promotion and delayed
new investment in the sector. Uncertainty was also transmitted to the other gen-
erators because many conventional generators were waiting to learn their final
positions in the market.
On the contrary, the new incentive scheme in place since 2014 has not been
subjected to substantial changes after being introduced and it can therefore be
considered a period of stability from a regulatory point of view. However, the
system has been subject to intense criticism, since it affected the renewable energy
sector by reducing the profitability of many renewable energy facilities (Rojas and
Tub́ıo, 2015). Under this new remuneration regime, incentive levels are now revised
every six years (in contrast with the FIT-FIP system, in which they were set for
20 years), increasing the levels of returns requested by investors. Additionally,
remuneration depends to a greater extent on market prices, increasing the pool
price fluctuation risk.
The new incentive scheme pivots around the “reasonable rate of return” con-
cept, given that the aim of the scheme is to balance system income and costs
to ensure the sustainability of the electricity system. This reasonable return for
RES-E facilities is calculated by adding 300 basic points to the yield on 10-year
Spanish sovereign bonds. This value was 7.389% before taxes when the system
was approved. When regulated revenue is not sufficient to cover all system costs,
a “coverage coefficient” comes into play, defined as the ratio between regulated
system costs and revenues.5 The result is that in the short term, RES-E genera-
tors will be affected by fluctuations in pool prices, but in the long term they will
be less exposed to regulatory risks.
3. Data and descriptive statistics
This study uses weekly electricity prices (measured in e/MWh) from the Span-
ish day-ahead market obtained from the Spanish market operator (OMIE, here-
inafter).6 Prices are constructed as the arithmetic mean of the daily prices of each
week for the period from 7 January 2002 to 31 December 2017, resulting in 834
observations.
The use of weekly prices instead of daily prices seems appropriate in this case,
given their time-scale flexibility (e.g. four lags mean one month). This is particu-
larly interesting when performing policy evaluation, since the effect of a regulatory
5Regulated costs affected by this coverage coefficient include supply continuity, capacity pay-
ments, renewable incentives, transmission costs and distribution costs, whereas regulated rev-
enues mainly include revenues from access tolls.
6For a detailed explanation of the Spanish pool see Ciarreta et al., 2014 and references therein.
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announcement would take weeks (or months) in translating into prices. Many
studies use weekly (or monthly) data to detect structural breaks to distinguish
structural breaks from spikes. For instance, Wang et al. (2015) use monthly data
from fisheries to detect structural breaks. Harvey and Lange (2018) use weekly
prices on several stock markets to analyze volatility. Finally, Sandberg (2018) use
monthly industrial production series in G7 countries to test for unit root when
multiple smooth breaks and nonlinear dynamics are present. Regarding electricity
markets, Apergis and Lau (2015) use weekly prices to analyze price instability
in several Australian electricity markets associated with structural breaks in re-
sponse to policy events. Valadkhani et al. (2018) use quarterly data on prices in
Australian state capitals to detect and analyze spikes in electricity and gas prices.
Mishra and Smyth (2014) employ monthly data on natural gas consumption in
the United States between April 1974 and September 2013 to show how shocks to
natural gas consumption result in temporary deviations from the long-run growth
path.
Table 2 shows the main descriptive statistics of the price series. The mean
price and standard deviation are 43.87e/MWh and 13.18e/MWh, respectively.
Prices show high volatility along the sample period with values ranging between
4.66e/MWh and 82.54e/MWh. Furthermore, volatility clusters are observed
(see Figure 1), which indicate that Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Het-
eroscedastic (GARCH) type models might be appropriate to model price volatility.
The probability price distribution is symmetric and does not have fat tails. Ac-
cording to the Jarque-Bera test, the price series distribution is normal. Regarding
the stationarity of the series, both Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips
and Perron (PP) unit root tests indicate that the price series is stationary.
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of prices
Minimum 4.66 St. Dev. 13.18
Maximum 82.54 Skewness 0.12
Mean 43.87 Kurtosis (exc.) 0.05
Median 44.29 Jarque-Bera 2.03
ADF −4.98a PP −6.52a
Note: a indicates rejection of the null hypothesis of unit root at the 1% level.
Source: Own work based on price data from the Spanish market operator, OMIE (2018a).
As mentioned above, lower electricity price levels are generally linked to periods
with higher RES-E share (see Figure 1), which would imply a negative correlation
between them. In order to analyze the pattern of the sample correlation between
both series over time, a time-varying correlation coefficient is calculated using a
moving window of 16 observations (four months approximately), resulting in a
time series of correlation coefficients. Analogously, a time-varying correlation co-
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efficient between RES-E share and price variances, obtained from daily prices, is
calculated. Both time series are shown in Figure 2. The series of time-varying co-
efficients between RES-E share and prices (solid line) shows a negative correlation
for most of the sample period, which might be a consequence of the replacement of
conventional, more expensive technologies by RES-E. By contrast, a positive cor-
relation between RES-E share and price variances (dashed line) can be observed.
The exception observed in the first years of the series is due to the high share of
CHP (which is subject to natural gas prices) compared to green technologies until
2007, where the current boost of renewable energy began after the enactment of
RD 661/2007.7 Note that, as mentioned in Section 1, both RES-E and CHP were
eligible to receive subsidies and are therefore included in our analysis.
Figure 2: Time-varying correlation between RES-E share and prices and between RES-E share
and variances
RES-E share - Price RES-E share - Variance










Source: Own work based on price data from the Spanish market operator: OMIE (2018a) for
prices and OMIE (2018b) for RES-E.
4. Methodology
There is extensive literature using GARCH processes to model time-varying
price volatility on electricity markets (see Chan et al., 2008, Higgs, 2009, Liu and
7CHP accounted for 55.2% of total subsidized electricity in 2002 and less than 35% from 2008
onwards. The figure for 2017 is 29.07%. By contrast, wind power accounted for a share of more
than 45% from 2008 onwards, with figures of 26.15% in 2002 and 49.42% in 2017. Similarly, solar
technologies were negligible until 2007 but accounted for 14.17% (8.65% for solar photovoltaic
and 5.52% for solar thermal) in 2017. Source: REE (2002-2017).
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Shi, 2013, and Ciarreta and Zarraga, 2016, among others).
These models rely on the assumption of constant unconditional variance of
prices over time. However, there can be regulatory changes on electricity markets
leading to structural breaks and therefore the assumption mentioned does not al-
ways hold. In other words, the parameters of the GARCH processes corresponding
to the conditional price volatility are affected by structural breaks.
Inclán and Tiao (1994) propose a cumulative sum of squares statistic (IT) to
test the null hypothesis of constant unconditional variance against the alternative
of one structural break. They also propose an iterative procedure, the so-called
Iterated Cumulative Sum of Squares (ICSS) algorithm, to detect multiple breaks
in variance, and which is applied to different sample pieces.
However, the main drawback of the test based on the IT statistic is that it
assumes that the disturbances are independently and identically distributed, which
does not hold for GARCH models. In this case, Sansó et al. (2004) show that
the IT statistic is significantly oversized and propose a nonparametric correction
of the IT statistic to solve this problem. The resulting statistic is the so-called
AIT statistic.8 We use the ICSS algorithm based on the AIT statistic to test
the null hypothesis of no structural break in the unconditional variance of prices
against the alternative of multiple breaks.9 The rejection of the null implies that
the unconditional variance is not stable over the whole sample period, so models
accounting for breaks should be considered in order to obtain reliable estimation
and forecast results.
We specify the following equation for the price series:






δiMit + εt, (1)
where pt is the price value at week t and Mi are dummy variables for each month
of the year from January to November, accounting for possible monthly effects
in the price series. The number of lags in prices is selected according to the
AIC criterion. We estimate the equation and apply the Ljung-Box statistic to
the corresponding residuals and squared residuals to determine whether GARCH
processes are justified. 10 As this is the case, we proceed as follows. First, we apply
the ICSS algorithm based on the AIT statistic to the residual series of equation (1)
to identify structural breaks. Then, we consider several GARCH-type processes for
the residuals, εt =
√
htut, where ht is the conditional variance and ut is a sequence
8A detailed explanation can be found in the original paper.
9The test identifies the dates of those breaks.
10Results of the tests show that residuals are uncorrelated while their squares are not, indicating
that residuals are dependent. Results are available upon request.
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of iid normal distributed random variables. Finally, we include the structural
breaks in the conditional variance.
Following Ewing and Malik (2017), we consider three different GARCH-type
processes. First, the standard GARCH(1,1):
ht = w + αε
2
t−1 + βht−1, (2)
where w > 0, α ≥ 0, β ≥ 0. The volatility persistence is measured by α + β,
which it is required to be strictly less than 1 to ensure that the unconditional vari-
ance is finite. The impact of both positive and negative shocks on the conditional
variance is the same. However, asymmetric effects are usually observed in elec-
tricity markets. Specifically, the so-called inverse leverage effect is often present
(see Bowden and Payne, 2008, Liu and Shi, 2013, and Ciarreta and Zarraga, 2016,
among others). This effect implies that good news leads to a larger increase in
price volatility than bad news.11 Therefore, we also consider GARCH-type models
accounting for asymmetric effects.
Second, we consider the GJR-GARCH(1,1) model by Glosten et al. (1993):
ht = w + αε
2
t−1 + βht−1 + θε
2
t−1It−1, (3)
where It−1 = 1 if εt−1 ≤ 0 and 0 otherwise. The coefficient θ captures the asym-
metric effects. A negative sign shows that positive shocks produce higher variation
than negative ones.
Finally, the asymmetric EGARCH(1,1) model by Nelson (1991):
log ht = w + φ1
|εt−1|√
ht−1




where the coefficients are not required to be positive, since even if log ht < 0, the
volatility will always be positive. The asymmetric response of the volatility due
to shocks of different signs is captured by φ2. A positive value of φ2 shows that
there is an inverse leverage effect.
The structural breaks are included in the three GARCH processes (Equations
2, 3 and 4) by adding the term
∑s
i=1 diSBit, where SBit for i = 1, · · · , s are dummy
variables which take the value one from each structural break onwards and zero
otherwise, and s is the number of breaks identified.12
11In financial markets the leverage effect is usually observed, which implies that negative shocks
affect price volatility more than positive shocks (see Nelson, 1991).
12Dummy variables for the structural breaks are also included in the mean equation (1) but
they are not significant. That is why they are included in the model only through the GARCH
processes.
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Equation (1) together with variance equations both ignoring and accounting
for structural breaks are estimated by maximum likelihood.
Finally, we calculate several out-of-sample forecast criteria (Mean Absolute Er-
ror, MAE, Root Mean Square Error, RMSE, and Mean Absolute Percentage Error,
MAPE)13 to asses the out-of-sample price forecast performance of the models for
the first 26 weeks of the year 2018 (until 1 July). We therefore estimate each
model using the sample period until 31 December 2017 and forecast the price for
the first week of 2018. Then, we estimate the models recursively adding one new
observation each time to obtain the price forecasts until 1 July 2018. The approach
of Andersen et al. (2003) is also used to compare the relative forecasting power of
different pairs of models.
5. Results
We detect two structural breaks using the ICSS algorithm based on the AIT
statistic. The first one, in the week starting 26 November 2012 and the second one
in the week starting 10 March 2014. Figure 3 shows the price path with the two
structural breaks and the corresponding bands at ±2 times standard deviation.
We estimate Equation (1) by maximum likelihood considering GARCH errors
as in Equations (2), (3) and (4). We then construct the dummy variables SB1
and SB2 taking value one from each break identified onwards and zero otherwise,
and include them in each variance equation to estimate the new equations again.
Table 3 reports the estimation results for each GARCH model both ignoring and
accounting for structural breaks.
Regarding the estimation results of the mean equation, there are no large dif-
ferences among the three GARCH processes considered. Prices are explained by
their own past, with the price of the last week and that of four weeks ago be-
ing significant and positive. Seasonal effects are observed. Estimated prices in
January, May, June, July, August and September are significantly higher than in
December for all models considered. This result is consistent with the trend of the
electricity price series over the year, in which prices are on average higher during
most of the summer months. Knittel and Roberts (2005) also observe this effect
for the Californian electricity market. In fact, electricity prices contain a strong
seasonal component, reflecting heating and cooling needs (see Moral-Carcedo and
Vicéns-Otero, 2005 and references herein). In particular, many heating systems
use natural gas rather than electricity, whereas air conditioning systems are es-
13MAE = 1N
∑N













where N is the number of forecast observations and p̂t is the predicted value of pt obtained from
the models considered.
13


















Source: Own work based on price data from the Spanish market operator: OMIE (2018a) for
prices.
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sentially electric. This could make electricity prices in summer higher in regions
such as Spain or California. Similarly, the low prices found in December can also
be explained in terms of the effect of the almost generalized reduction in activ-
ity for the Christmas break, since holidays are associated with large declines in
electricity demand. Furthermore, other monthly effects are observed, but results
differ among the models. A common result is that the magnitude of the estimated
coefficients corresponding to the seasonal effects is larger when structural breaks
are accounted for in the models. This implies that ignoring structural breaks leads
to underestimate the seasonal effects.
Estimation results of the variance equation for each GARCH model show that
most coefficients are significant. It should be noted that, in line with other studies
(see Arouri et al., 2012, Mensi et al., 2014 and 2015, and Ewing and Malik, 2017,
among others) the volatility persistence is overestimated when ignoring structural
breaks.14 In the standard GARCH model, the estimated volatility persistence
(α̂ + β̂) is larger than one and therefore, the unconditional variance is not finite.
However, when accounting for structural breaks the estimated volatility persistence
decreases to 0.92. This result is also observed in the rest of the models since there
is a decrease in the estimated volatility persistence (α̂ + β̂ + θ̂/2 for Equation 3
and β̂ for Equation 4) when accounting for structural breaks.
The coefficients that measure the asymmetric effects of shocks on price volatility
are significant. The estimated coefficient θ̂ in the GJR-GARCH model is negative,
showing that the estimated impact of positive shocks on volatility (α̂ = 0.42 and
0.33 when ignoring and accounting for structural breaks, respectively) is larger
than that of negative ones (α̂ + θ̂ = 0.20 and 0.16 when ignoring and accounting
for structural breaks, respectively). A similar pattern is observed in the estimation
results of the EGARCH model since the estimated effect of positive shocks is also
greater than that of negative ones. Specifically, positive shocks have an estimated
impact of φ̂1 + φ̂2 = 0.59 and 0.39 when ignoring and accounting for breaks,
respectively, whereas the estimated effect of negative shocks is φ̂1 − φ̂2 = 0.39
when neglecting breaks, and 0.34 when accounting for them. These results show
the presence of an inverse leverage effect, usually found on electricity markets and
it is associated to the convexity exhibited in the marginal generation costs (Knittel
and Roberts, 2005).
Table 3 also shows that structural breaks are significant. The estimated coef-
ficient for the first break (d̂1) is positive, which indicates larger volatility after the
first break. On the contrary, the negative sign of the estimated coefficient for the
second break (d̂2) shows a decrease of volatility after the second break detected.
14Hillebrand (2005) shows that not accounting for structural changes when estimating a
GARCH model leads to an upward biased volatility persistence.
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Table 3: Estimation results.
Ignoring structural breaks Including structural breaks
GARCH GJR-GARCH EGARCH GARCH GJR-GARCH EGARCH
γ̂0 0.15 -0.17 -0.53 -0.11 -0.33 -0.51
γ̂1 0.83
a 0.82a 0.83a 0.84a 0.83a 0.83a
γ̂2 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 −0.01a
γ̂3 0.04 0.06 0.08
c 0.02 0.03 0.04
γ̂4 0.10
a 0.09b 0.08b 0.12a 0.11a 0.10a
δ̂1 2.47
a 3.03a 3.05a 2.76a 3.12a 3.15a
δ̂2 -0.28 0.24 -0.12 0.23 0.55 0.19
δ̂3 0.43 1.13 1.21
c 0.72 1.22 1.13
δ̂4 1.24 1.91
a 1.98a 1.52c 2.03b 2.04a
δ̂5 2.70
a 3.23a 3.31a 3.06a 3.43a 3.43a
δ̂6 2.18
a 2.78a 2.87a 2.59a 3.03a 3.02a
δ̂7 1.68
b 2.25a 2.27a 2.04b 2.44a 2.43a
δ̂8 1.70
b 2.21a 2.29a 2.05a 2.41a 2.36a
δ̂9 1.77
b 2.30a 2.15a 2.16a 2.56a 2.35a
δ̂10 0.75 1.15
c 1.27b 0.99 1.34c 1.36c
δ̂11 1.15
b 1.27 1.47b 2.26a 2.44a 2.42a
ŵ 1.48a 1.49a −0.13c 1.81a 1.79a 0.03
α̂ 0.33a 0.42a 0.25a 0.33a








d̂2 −15.75b −15.67a −0.27a
Log-lik. -2461.03 -2457.32 -2450.64 -2449.12 -2446.32 -2439.65
Q stat. 1.51 2.27 3.21 0.20 0.37 1.38
Q2 stat. 11.06b 7.77c 10.11b 7.64c 6.38c 7.20c
a, b and c indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Q stat. and Q2 stat. stand for Ljung-Box statistic for the null hypothesis of no
correlation in the residuals and squared residuals of each model, respectively.
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According to the value of the log-likelihood function, the best model is the
EGARCH that accounts for the breaks identified. The last two rows of Table 3
show the results of the Ljung-Box statistic applied to the residuals of each model
and their squares. Both residuals and squared residuals can be seen to be uncorre-
lated at the 5% significance level for the selected model, which shows the adequacy
of the model.
In summary, it should be noted that, on the one hand asymmetric effects should
be taken into account when modeling price volatility and, on the other hand,
ignoring structural breaks overestimates the asymmetric responses of shocks of
different signs. Furthermore, ignoring structural breaks in price modeling upward
biases the volatility persistence and underestimates the seasonal effects. This
remarks the importance of taking into account structural breaks and asymmetric
effects in volatility modeling.
Finally, we use three out-of-sample forecast criteria (MAE, RMSE and MAPE)
to assess the price forecast performance of the three GARCH-type models including
structural breaks given the importance of accounting for them. The results are
consistent with those of in-sample forecast as the EGARCH model is the best to
forecast prices for the 26 first weeks of 2018, according to the three criteria.15
These results reinforce the importance of taking asymmetric effects into account
when modeling and forecasting prices. The approach of Andersen et al. (2003)
in the comparison of the forecasting accuracy of the three pairs of GARCH-type
models including structural breaks does not give any conclusive result.16
6. Discussion
According to the structural breaks detected, we identify three different phases
in the electricity price series, coinciding with different regulatory periods con-
cerning RES-E support: (i) Phase I: Strong RES-E support (FIT-FIP system),
from January 2002 until November 2012; (ii) Phase II: RES-E support halt, from
November 2012 to March 2014 together with uncertainty on the content of the new
regulatory regime and (iii) Phase III: New RES-E scheme (market-based), from
March 2014 to December 2017 (see Table 4).
Differences in the price volatility of the three phases can be related to the
evolution of the regulatory system in Spain, which is directly linked with RES-
E share levels. We argue that the structural breaks we found could be related
to RES-E regulation. Specifically, standard deviation of prices during Phase I
(increasing presence of RES-E during the FIT-FIP regime) was 13.4. During Phase
II, however, the regulatory instability of the abolishment of the FIT-FIP scheme
15Results are available from the authors upon request.
16Results are available upon request.
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Table 4: Structural breaks in Spanish electricity spot price volatility
Phase Name Dates Regulatory system Std. Dev.
I Strong RES-E support 01/07/2002-11/25/2012 FIT-FIP in force 13.43
II RES-E support halt 11/26/2012-03/09/2014 FIT-FIP progressive 15.74
phase-out
III New RES-E scheme 03/10/2014-12/31/2017 Regulatory system based 10.78
on return to investment
resulted in increased price volatility with respect to the previous level (standard
deviation grew up to 15.74). Additionally, these cost-containing measures devoted
to RES-E policies halted the RES-E expansion trend. Finally, price volatility
shrunk even further in Phase III than in Phase I (standard deviation of 10.78)
and RES-E started its recovery after a new support scheme more market-oriented
came into force, but still did not reach the expansion levels of the FIT scheme.
The relationship between RES-E support schemes and price volatility is a very
relevant topic, but at the same time it is very difficult to account for many different
changes in regulations and market developments that affect that relationship. In
particular, during the study period the electricity market was also affected by two
major events apart from renewable-oriented policy measures: (i) other regulatory
resolutions; and (ii) changes in installed capacity.
Regarding the first event, there were other important regulatory changes not
aimed at RES-E that have not resulted in structural changes. In July 2007, not
only was Royal Decree 661/2007 (BOE, 2007) promoting RES-E via a FIT-FIP
scheme passed, but the MIBEL market, the integrated market of electricity be-
tween Spain and Portugal, was also launched. This larger market was an impor-
tant step towards the integration of the European single electricity market. In this
sense, the Price Coupling of Regions project of European Power Exchanges was
launched in 2009 to obtain a single price coupling solution to be used to calculate
electricity prices subject to the capacity of the relevant network. However, these
important regulatory measures did not result in any significant break in the price
time series because it was not followed by a significant increase in the interconnec-
tion capacity. Therefore, volatility transmissions across markets were not an issue.
In February 2010, another important Spanish regulatory milestone was enacted:
the promotion of national coal over imported coal and other conventional tech-
nologies (Royal Decree 134/2010, BOE, 2010a). This measure had an important
impact on combined cycle technologies, which are marginal technologies together
with coal, since they were taken out from the market to be substituted by national
coal. However, the absence of structural breaks in the electricity price series in
2010 may be due to the fact that peak demand was met and price spikes did not
occur. Finally, Royal Decree 900/2015 (BOE, 2015a), regulating self-consumption
and seeking to ensure fair burden-sharing among electricity grid users, did not lead
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to any structural break. This was likely down this new piece of regulation actually
preventing large scale entry of self-generators.
Concerning the role of installed capacity in the structural breaks, Ciarreta et
al. 2017b show that both RES-E and combined cycle technologies received all new
investment in Spain from 2002 onwards. While the installed capacity of nuclear
power, hydropower over 50MW and coal plants remained almost constant after
2002, there were important capacity increases for combined cycle units (719%)
and RES-E technologies (225%) in the period of analysis. Furthermore, after 2007
RES-E and combined cycle technologies can be considered as substitutes in terms
of investment, as new investment was transferred from combined cycle, which
was no longer growing, to green capacity. However, the development of installed
capacity in Spain did not lead to any structural break in the electricity price series.
The intermittent availability of RES-E from sources such as hydro, solar or
wind power may also affect electricity prices. Therefore, electricity systems also
incorporate a series of intra-day markets and flexible adjustment mechanisms,
including ancillary services and capacity payments, which add a significant amount
of flexible ramping and capacity products. Considering these adjustment markets
in Spain from 2004 to 2017, the weight of the day-ahead market in final electricity
prices is found to be always higher than 80%, as Table 5 shows. Moreover, in
2017, after the regulation concerning the participation of renewable sources on
balancing mechanisms entered into force, this share reached 88.53%, pushing down
the weight of the balancing services in electricity prices even further. Similarly,
intra-day markets could also be considered in a volatility analysis. However, when
the volumes of energy traded in the day-ahead market and intra-day markets are
compared, Table 6 shows that the energy share of the day-ahead market as a
proportion of the total energy traded is, again, over 80% from 2004 to 2017 (and
indeed over 85% for most of the years). Therefore, given the important role of
the day-ahead market in both final electricity prices and energy volumes, here we
do not take into account other secondary markets and services but rather focus
exclusively on day-ahead market data.
Finally, it is also worth noting that we only consider electricity prices in our
analysis, despite the volatility that may arise in other markets such as those for
conventional fuels (i.e. oil, coal, gas) and carbon pricing. There is empirical
evidence in the literature of a correlation between electricity and fuel prices (Furió
and Chuliá, 2012) and between electricity and carbon prices (Fabra and Reguant,
2014). This suggests that there could be a price pass-through of fuel and carbon
prices in bids by conventional producers, so changes in these markets would already
be included in electricity prices.
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Table 5: Weight of the price components on the final electricity price in Spain [%]. Period
2004-2017.
Day-ahead Market ancillary services Capacity payments
2004 81.26 5.95 12.74
2005 89.43 3.37 7.23
2006 83.80 8.41 7.79
2007 87.74 4.52 7.74
2008 94.60 3.78 1.62
2009 86.50 6.90 6.70
2010 85.42 8.16 6.51
2011 86.10 5.33 8.71
2012 83.18 7.89 9.03
2013 80.92 9.79 9.41
2014 79.85 10.38 9.85
2015 82.75 6.82 7.39
2016 84.31 6.43 5.27
2017 88.53 3.90 4.17
Source: Own work based on data from the Spanish market operator (OMIE 2008-2017, OMIE
2019).

















Source: Own work based on data from the Spanish market operator (OMIE 2008-2017).
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7. Conclusions
This paper links structural breaks to regulatory changes promoting RES-E
occurred in the Spanish electricity market between 2002 and 2017. We find two
structural breaks which imply three phases. According to the price volatility of
each phase we can conclude that the existence of regulation uncertainty is related
to the period of price instability between 2012 and 2014, which meant greater
volatility than in the other two phases. Volatility negatively affects market agents
and forces them to implement hedging strategies to protect the value of their
assets.
The implementation of a stable renewable remuneration regulatory framework
has favored security in the investments. The new regulatory scheme is able to pro-
mote RES-E generation at a lower volatility than the previous scheme based on
FIT-FIP. This implies that market-based policy measures encourage good integra-
tion of intermittent renewable electricity in the Spanish electricity system. Ceteris
paribus, it does not necessarily mean that average price has decreased with the
new system, but is more stable. In the future, the regulatory framework should be
further adapted to balance volatility and increasing shares of RES-E generation.
Our results show how market agents seem to be more concerned with regulation
uncertainty than expected regulation changes themselves as agents can react by
changing their investment behavior in the latter case. During the 2012-2014 period,
the government announced that a new regulatory framework controlling the tariff
deficit was necessary. However, it was not finally enacted until 2014 and that
prevented agents from optimally deciding on their investment plans. Stable over-
time policies encouraging smoother RES-E integration help to reduce negative
effects on price risk and excessive volatility.
This result also has interesting policy lessons for countries facing similar chal-
lenges with their incentive systems. Regulatory systems based on FIT have been
widely explored in the literature, given their widespread presence worldwide; how-
ever, our analysis of the new Spanish support mechanism for RES-E based on
the reasonable return principle is innovative. Spain is, indeed, an interesting case
study for the effect of renewable energy policies, given the high shares of RES-E
and the changing characteristics of the regulatory framework over the years. In a
world where the transition to low carbon economies is already a reality, this is a
very relevant issue.
Finally, our results also suggest that, on the one hand asymmetric effects should
be taken into account when modeling price volatility and, on the other hand,
ignoring structural breaks overestimates the asymmetric responses of shocks of
different signs. It is also worth mentioning that not all regulatory changes yield
structural breaks. For instance, the integration of the Spanish and Portuguese
electricity markets in 2007 and the Price Coupling of Regions initiative in 2009
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did not lead to any structural break, despite being one of the milestones after the
liberalization of the electricity market in the Iberian peninsula. Furthermore, the
regulation of self-consumption that entered into force in 2015 and the participation
of renewable sources in balancing mechanisms did not lead to any structural break
either.
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Appendices
Appendix A. The rate of return regulation
This appendix is based on a previous paper by Ciarreta and Pizarro-Irizar
(2014).
Royal Decree 413/2014 regulates the new legal regime and economic activity
of electricity production from renewable energy, combined heat and power (CHP),
and waste, to which Order IET/1045/2014 is added, in which the remuneration
parameters of the facility types are approved. The new regulatory framework for
renewable sources, CHP, and waste is thus passed and the remuneration regime
established in Act 54/1997 and RD 661/2007 is completely abolished.
The main objective of the new regulatory framework is to guarantee the stabil-
ity of the electricity system, based on the principle of reasonable “rate of return”
on a series of facility types, so that renewable and CHP technologies can cover costs
that cannot be recovered in the market without incurring an excessive burden for
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the system. The return on each facility is, therefore, the result of the application
of the following formulas during the regulatory lifetime of the facility type:
Rf = RSmp +Re + Iinv
Re = Rinv +Ro
Rinv = ICft
Ro = OCft −MRft
Where Rf stands for the return of the facility, RSmp is the return on sales
at market price, Re refers to a specific return and Iinv is the incentive to invest
in facilities in non-mainland electricity systems that involve overall reductions in
generation costs. The Re, in turn, depends on the return on investment (Rinv),
which is calculated from the rate of facility investment costs not recovered (ICft)
and the return on the operation (Ro), obtained as the difference between the
operating costs of the facility type (OCft) and the market revenue of the facility
type (MRft).
Additional parameters are as follows:
a) Standard value of the initial investment of the facility type. b) Estimation
of the daily and intra-daily market prices. c) Number of hours of operation of the
facility type. d) Estimation of future income from production market share. e)
Other operating income as defined in Article 24 (for example, possible calls for
public aid, waste disposal fees, income from the production of associated useful
heat, etc.). f) Estimation of future operating costs. g) Update rate taking the
value of “reasonable rate of return”. h) Adjustment coefficient of the facility type.
i) Net asset value.
The concept of reasonable “rate of return” is established around the average
yield of ten-year state bonds (plus a differential) for the 24 months prior to May
of the year prior to the start of the regulatory period. For existing facilities, the
differential for the first period is 300 basic points on the average performance in
the ten-year secondary market prior to the entry into force of RD 413/2014.
This scheme establishes six-year regulatory periods, which in turn are divided
into two three-year regulatory half-periods. The first regulatory period ends in
2019, while the first regulatory half-period ends in 2016.
The return parameters may be revisited at the end of each half-period or reg-
ulatory period. When the parameters are updated at the end of one regulatory
period all the return parameters may be modified, including the value of the “rea-
sonable rate of return”. The only parameters that cannot be modified once they
are defined are the regulatory useful lifetime and the standard value of the initial
investment of a facility type. Additionally, for those technologies whose operating
costs depend on fuel prices, parameters are updated yearly.
In the revisions of the regulatory half-periods, two variables are reviewed for
the rest of the regulatory period: (i) production market price estimates (adjusted
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to real market prices); and (ii) income from the sale of energy generated (valued at
the price of the production market), depending on the trend in market prices and
forecasts of operating hours of the facility. The calculation of the return parameters
also includes upper and lower limits for the estimation of energy sales. This term
is called “value of adjustment for deviations in the market price”: it is offset over
the useful lifetime of the facility and also generates a positive or negative balance
when the average annual price of the daily and intra-daily market is outside these
limits.
The number of hours of operation for a specific period is determined by the
ratio of energy sold on the market to installed capacity. If the facility has a number
of equivalent hours of operation in a year that is lower than the threshold of the
corresponding facility type, it could lose the right to the specific return.
Finally, in terms of the useful lifetime of the facility types, 20 years are con-
sidered for CHP and wind, 25 years for thermo-solar, mini-hydro, biomass and
biogas and 30 years for photovoltaic solar technology. Once the facilities exceed
the regulatory useful life, they may remain in operation, but without receiving the
remuneration for the investment and the remuneration for the operation. In this
case they will only receive payment from the sale of energy in the market.
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97-126.
Ciarreta, A. and Zarraga, A., 2016. Modeling realized volatility on the Spanish
intra-day electricity market. Energy Economics, 58, 152-163.
CNE/CNMC, (2007-2013). National Energy Commission/National Commis-
sion of Markets and Competence (CNE/CNMC). Liquidaciones de actividades




De Vries, L.J. and Hakvoort, R.A., 2004. The Question of Generation Ad-
equacy in Liberalised Electricity Markets. FEEM Working Paper No. 120.04
26
(September 2004).
del Rı́o, P., 2008. Ten years of renewable electricity policies in Spain: An
analysis of successive feed-in tariff reforms. Energy Policy, 36, 2917-2929.
Espinosa, M.P. and Pizarro-Irizar, C., 2018. Is renewable energy a cost-effective
mitigation resource? An application to the Spanish electricity market. Renewable
and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 94, 902-914.
Ewing, B.T. and Malik, F., 2017. Modelling asymmetric volatility in oil prices
under structural breaks. Energy Economics, 63, 227-233.
Fabra, N. and Reguant, M., 2014. Pass-Through of emissions costs in electricity
markets. American Economic Review, 104(9), 2872-2899.
Fagiani, R. and Hakvoort, R., 2014. The role of regulatory uncertainty in cer-
tificate markets: A case study of the Swedish/Norwegian market. Energy Policy,
65, 608-618.
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